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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/12
TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#)
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE - 001 (TELEMETRY),
February 12, 2010

REF: 10 CD GENEVA 31 (SFO-GVA-VIII-017)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-041.

SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUESTED

[1](#)2. (S) The Russian Side has emphatically stated its position on the exchange of telemetric information in the START Follow-On Treaty, emphasizing that it is not necessary for Treaty verification. Nevertheless, Russia has agreed to a telemetry exchange to facilitate U.S. ratification of the Treaty. The current Russian proposal, however, differs from the concepts discussed during the Mullen-Makarov meetings on January 22 in Moscow, and would provide for a non-substantive exchange of telemetric information. The delegation seeks clarification and guidance on how to respond to the Russian proposal (reftel). Background and analysis are in paragraphs 3-5. Guidance request is in paragraph 6. End summary.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

13. (S) The Russian delegation has consistently stated that a telemetry exchange is not necessary for verification in the START Follow-on Treaty. The U.S. Side has clarified that a telemetry exchange is necessary for the U.S. ratification process and the Russian Side has reluctantly agreed to include a section on telemetry in the protocol. The current Russian proposal differs from the concepts discussed in Moscow and would provide for a non-substantive exchange of telemetric information. It would deny the U.S. Side a role in the process of determining the test flights for which telemetric information would be received, limiting its value for adequately understanding Russian missile developments. The Russian delegation has indicated there is some flexibility to modify the content of its proposal if the U.S. is willing to work on ways to resolve Russian offense-defense relationship concerns.

14. (S) On February 9th, the U.S. Side agreed to provide a proposal in response to the current Russian proposal prior to the next Telemetry Working Group meeting.

15. (S) The Russian proposal differs from the discussions during the January 2010 Mullen-Makarov meeting resulting in four major problems:

* The annual exchange review would allow either side to suspend the exchange on the basis of unresolved concerns.

This contradicts what the U.S. believed was the Mullen-Makarov agreement to continue the exchange specified in the treaty if a resolution of differences could not be achieved.

* The testing side would have the right to determine those flight tests where telemetry would be exchanged with no role for the receiving side in the selection process. Russia would likely provide data only on test flights that are of least interest to the U.S.

This contradicts Mullen-Makarov guidance to have a mutual understanding on how flight tests would be chosen for the telemetric exchange.

* The telemetry associated with the self-contained dispensing mechanism or post-boost vehicle would not be exchanged. These data contain information concerning the number of reentry vehicles and procedures for dispensing reentry vehicles.

While not an explicit component of the Mullen-Makarov discussions, this is a primary reason for conducting the exchange of telemetry.

* The interpretive data required for determining staging, separation, and acceleration would not be exchanged.

While not a component of the Mullen-Makarov discussions, this information facilitates an understanding of the exchanged telemetric data.

GUIDANCE REQUESTED

¶6. (S) Request clarification on those elements of the current Russian proposal that are acceptable and guidance on required changes to the remaining elements of the Russian proposal to meet the objectives of the Mullen-Makarov discussions and to ensure adequate transparency and a viable role for the U.S. both in the selection of test flights for an exchange of telemetry and during the annual exchange review.

¶7. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
LARSON